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I. COOPERATION IS THE WATCH WORD OF THE DAY
[1] A fundamental tenet of the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (the “2006 Amendments”) is the notion that parties can
agree and cooperate on issues relating to electronic discovery. Many of
*
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the rule changes now either require parties to meet and confer about
electronic discovery or presuppose a certain level of dialogue between the
parties regarding such issues.
[2] Rule 26, for example, which mandates the first live meeting between
the parties, states that the “attorneys of record . . . are jointly responsible
for . . . attempting in good faith to agree to the proposed discovery
plan….”1 The discovery plan, in turn, must address the parties’ “views
and proposals on . . . any issues about disclosure or discovery of
electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which it
should be produced.”2 Likewise, Rule 16(b) has permitted the courts’
scheduling order to “provide for disclosure or discovery of electronically
stored information” and to “include any agreements the parties reach for
asserting claims of privilege . . . after information is produced.”3
[3] Against this backdrop of anticipated cooperation, the criteria for
resolving disputes remain fundamentally the same. As in prior versions of
the Rules, the court may limit the frequency or extent of discovery after
taking into consideration whether “the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case,
the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues.”4
[4] Although balancing the burden and expense of discovery with its
likely benefit is certainly not a novel concept, it takes on a much higher
level of significance when dealing with electronically-stored information
(“ESI”). More importantly, this balancing can have a profound effect on
lawyers responsible for the zealous representation of their clients. The
incentives for striking a balance regarding electronic discovery depend, in
large part, on how much discovery a party is likely to face. Good faith
negotiations, cooperation, and bipartisan agreement can play an important
and productive role in governing the conduct of parties when each party is
faced with the prospect of costly electronic discovery. However, in civil
1

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(2)(3)(C).
3
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii-iv).
4
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
2
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disputes where one side has a significantly higher volume of ESI, such as
in employment litigation, the incentive for bilateral cooperation on
discovery issues is significantly diminished.
[5] In commercial litigation involving corporate entities, both parties
usually have substantial (or at least comparable) volumes of potentially
relevant ESI. Accordingly, both sides have an incentive to agree on
methods for controlling the cost of preserving, searching, and producing
discoverable information. Parties with equivalent volumes of ESI are
more likely to reach a détente regarding such issues as the scope of
production, the form of production, recovery of inadvertently produced
privileged information, and similar issues.
[6] Employment litigation, in contrast, usually involves one or more
individuals suing an employer or former employer. Even in class or
collective actions, where large numbers of potential class members may be
involved, the plaintiff class is a group of individual employees and the
defendant is, most often, the organization that employed them. As a
result, the corporate defendant is likely to have a much greater volume of
ESI with which to contend.
[7] Employers usually have significantly larger volumes of ESI in their
possession that may be relevant to the litigation. Even if the body of truly
irrelevant information turns out to be substantially smaller, it is usually
true that the potential universe of relevant ESI is much greater for the
employer than the employee. For example, electronic mail messages
regarding the employee are more likely to be kept on the employer’s
server.5 Information regarding the reasons for the employment action at
issue, such as a reduction in force, is almost always in the possession of
the employer.6 Employers maintain personnel databases which may
contain potentially discoverable information in disparate impact cases, i.e.
when one or more employees allege that a neutral employment action had
5

See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (recognizing that
an employer’s e-mail servers, including optical disk and tape backups, likely contained
electronic mail messages relating to the plaintiff in a discrimination matter, and ordering
sample of backup tapes to be restored and searched for discovery purposes).
6
See, e.g., Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640 (D. Kan. 2005)
(requiring defendant employer to produce ESI, along with embedded metadata,
associated with Sprint/United’s decision making process during reduction in force).
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a disproportionate impact on certain categories of individuals on account
of age, race, gender, or some other protected characteristic.7 Indeed, with
the limited exception of certain diaries, journals, memos created by the
employee, or correspondence directly to or from the employee, the vast
majority of relevant ESI in employment litigation will likely reside with
the employer.
[8] The difficulty lies in balancing the need to discover potentially
relevant information with the risk of one party having unfair leverage over
the other. The former is, of course, required for litigation to be objectively
decided on the facts. The latter is a concern when the inherent costs of
electronic discovery systemically force one party to either resolve cases
that would otherwise be decided on the merits, or resolve them at a higher
price because electronic discovery is inevitable. This concern does not
presuppose or require any inappropriate or unethical behavior on the part
of employees or their counsel. Indeed, the cost of litigation has always
been a factor in determining whether to settle, and lawyers have a duty to
be honest with their adversary in discussing material facts of the case,
including the potential cost of discovery.8
[9] The systemic concerns exist, however, in light of the 2006
Amendments and the increased preeminence of electronic discovery in
civil litigation. As a result, those costs are much higher than they used to
be.9 In employment litigation, the risks are magnified because electronic
discovery costs may quickly dwarf the value of the litigation itself, as
measured by potential damages. Compensatory and punitive damages in
Title VII cases, for example, are limited to $300,000.10 The median jury
verdict for discrimination cases nationwide, based on research of matters

7

See, e.g., Raytheon v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2004).
See, e.g., Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp.,212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446 (D. Md. 2002)
(discussing an attorney’s obligation to avoid material misrepresentations in the context of
settlement obligations).
9
Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 311 (“As individuals and corporations increasingly do
business electronically . . . the universe of discoverable material has expanded
exponentially. The more information there is to discover, the more expensive it is to
discovery all the relevant information. . . .”).
10
42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(b)(3).
8
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between 2000 and 2006, was $200,000.11 The median settlement amount
was even lower – $70,000.12 The combination of relatively modest case
valuations with significantly increased electronic discovery costs may
have a profound – and perhaps unintended – impact on the resolution of
employment related litigation. Although not limited to employment cases,
one study has already found that one in five corporate respondents have
settled litigation to avoid the costs of electronic discovery.13
[10] Given the economic realities of employment litigation, therefore, it is
instructional to review the cost shifting criteria associated with electronic
discovery both before and after the 2006 Amendments.
II. BEFORE THE 2006 AMENDMENTS
[11] One of the seminal cases addressing cost shifting for electronic
discovery before the 2006 Amendments was Zubulake v. UBS Warburg.14
In this gender discrimination and retaliation case, the court analyzed
whether an employer had an obligation to search backup tapes for e-mails
related to the plaintiff, and evaluated who had to pay for the cost of those
searches. In analyzing these questions, the court established a seven factor
test for determining whether cost shifting should occur in the context of
electronic discovery:
(1) The extent to which the request is specifically tailored
to discover relevant information.
(2) The availability of information from other sources.
(3) The total cost of the production, compared to the
amount in controversy.

11

JVD Releases Its New Study of Employment Practice Liability Trends and Statistics for
2007, EMP. PRAC. LIABILITY VERDICTS AND SETTLEMENTS, Nov. 2007, LRP
Publications, at 2.
12
Jury Verdict Research Study Yields Statistics Analyzing Settlement Claims, EMP. PRAC.
LIABILITY VERDICTS AND SETTLEMENTS, Oct. 2007, LRP Publications, at 2.
13
THE AMENDED FRCP: ONE YEAR LATER 3 (Fortiva 2007) (available by request at
www.fortiva.com).
14
Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 311
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(4) The total cost of production, compared to the resources
available to each party.
(5) The relative ability of each party to control costs and its
incentive to do so.
(6) The importance of issues at stake in the litigation.
(7)
Relative benefits of the parties obtaining the
information.15
[12] The court also determined that these factors should not be weighed
equally, but instead they should be weighed in descending order of
importance, with numbers (1) and (2) being the most important, (3), (4)
and (5) being the next group, and (6) and (7) being independent groups of
lesser importance.16
[13] Despite the relative appearance of objectivity in the seven factor test,
it tips decidedly against employers in employment litigation.
[14] The first factor, the extent to which a request is specifically tailored
to discover relevant information, fails to account for the fundamental costs
of electronic discovery, even in responding to a narrowly tailored
discovery request. For example, the document request at issue in
Zubulake was that the defendant produce “all documents [including ESI]
concerning any communication by or between UBS employees concerning
plaintiff.”17 In an employment case alleging gender discrimination and
retaliation with regard to the terms and conditions of plaintiff’s
employment, it would appear that the request for “all communications
15

Zubulake, 217 F.R.D at 322. The “new” seven factor test was actually a modified test
from a prior opinion in the same court. See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris
Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Interestingly, one of the factors
added to the cost shifting test by the Zubulake court was consideration of the “amount in
controversy” in the litigation. Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 321. Initially, this would appear
to balance some of the concerns relating to high discovery costs in low-value
employment cases. However, as discussed infra, the placement of this factor in the
overall hierarchy of the Zubulake test all but negates its balancing effect.
16
Zubulake, 217 F.R.D.. at 322-23.
17
Id. at 312.
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concerning the plaintiff” is, in fact, fairly narrowly tailored. However, in
the electronic age, “all communications” includes all electronic mail
messages, which may encompass evidence located only on backup tapes.
Such information may be costly to restore and search, as was evidenced by
UBS’s estimate that the cost of producing the emails on its backup tapes
would be approximately $300,000.18 Thus the cost of fully responding to
a single document request would actually have matched the statutory cap
on compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII.19 Herein lies the
flaw in giving preeminence to the first Zubulake factor: Even a narrowly
tailored request for information may be so cost-intensive as to surpass the
overall value of the litigation in question.
[15] The second factor in Zubulake, the availability of information from
other sources, also cuts consistently against the employer. As discussed
above, the availability of information from other sources is virtually
meaningless in employment litigation, because the vast body of ESI will
ordinarily rest with the employer.
Personnel records, aggregated
employment data, and electronic communication regarding relevant topics
will, for a variety of reasons most likely reside on the employer’s
computers or the employer’s network. Moreover, this information will be
exclusive to the employer. Again, to use Zubulake as an example, the
plaintiff had independently retained over 450 e-mails that either
mentioned her by name or related in some way to her employment.20
Despite the fact that the plaintiff had actually retained more electronic
communication than the defendant (at least with respect to its live
electronic systems), the court assumed that other relevant e-mails existed
exclusively in the employer’s backup tapes, stating “[c]learly, numerous
responsive e-mails had been created and deleted at UBS, and Zubulake
wanted them.”21 Thus, when applying the second factor in the costshifting test, information will frequently be available only from the
employer’s data systems, even where the employee has collected and
retained a subset of such information on his or her own.
18

Id. at 313.
Although Zubulake sued under New York Civil Rights law and the Administrative
Code of the City of New York, which do not have comparable caps, for comparison
purposes the analogy remains valid.
20
Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 313.
21
Id.
19
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[16] Likewise, two of the next three factors also weigh heavily against
employers. The fourth factor, the total cost of production compared to the
resources available to each party, flatly applies the “David versus Goliath”
rule and penalizes the employer for having greater resources than the
employee. Rarely, if ever, would those tables be turned and would this
factor weigh in favor of shifting the costs of production to the employee.
[17] The fifth factor, the relative ability of each party to control costs and
its incentive to do so, is at best a two-edged sword. As discussed above,
even when faced with even a reasonable discovery request, full
compliance on the part of an employer might require a significant
expenditure of costs despite the best efforts to curtail the same. In
contrast, an employee with little or no ESI at his or her disposal has little
or no incentive to control costs associated with electronic discovery. As
individuals, employees may have, at most, a personal computer with
potentially relevant information, and one or more online accounts, such as
an electronic mail account provided by a public internet service provider.
Employees, therefore, need not confront the significant expense associated
with searching data networks, servers, e-mail archives and backup tapes in
responding to discovery.
[18] The purpose for the seven-factor test is both legitimate and
admirable. In analyzing whether cost shifting should be considered, the
Zubulake court framed the issue against the backdrop of disparate
resources in employment litigation:
Courts must remember that cost shifting may effectively
end discovery, especially when private parties are engaged
in litigation with large corporations. As large companies
increasingly move to entirely paper-free environments, the
frequent use of cost-shifting as well will have the effect of
crippling discovery in discrimination and retaliation cases.
Both undermine the “strong public policy in resolving
disputes on their merits” and may ultimately deter the filing
of potentially meritorious claims.22

22

Id. at 317-318.
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[19] While this public policy concern is without a doubt legitimate, the
seven factor test that resulted from Zubulake allows the pendulum to
swing too far in the opposite direction. When the majority of the factors
deemed most important are inherently adverse to the employer, even
assuming good faith discovery practices on the part of the plaintiff, the
potential impact on litigation is significant and dangerous. Even
employers involved in cases with little or no evidence of liability, but
nevertheless faced with several hundred thousands of dollars in discovery
costs, may quickly conclude that settlement of a meritless claim is a better
option than incurring those costs.
III. THE 2006 RULE CHANGES
[20] Against the backdrop of the Zubulake decision, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were amended, effective December 2006. In the context
of cost shifting, perhaps the most important rule is Rule 26(b)(2)(C). Rule
26 indicates that a party “need not provide discovery of electronically
stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost.”23 Further, the Rule provides
that the court may deny a discovery demand if:
a) It is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is
obtainable from another source that is more convenient,
less burdensome, or less expensive;
b)
The parties seeking discovery had had ample
opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the
information sought; or
c) The burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs
of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’
resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation.24

23
24

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
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[21] This Rule carries over two of the fundamental problems (at least
from the employer’s perspective) from the Zubulake seven-factor test.25
First, the Rule relies on an undefined distinction between accessible and
inaccessible ESI. Therefore, courts will more likely continue to look to
the analysis in Zubulake because it remains one of the most
comprehensive discussions on the topic.
[22] That discussion, however, simply assumes that employers should
bear the cost of searching any accessible data in their possession.26 At
first glance, this would seem to comport with the language of the new
Rule 26. However, the Zubulake court effectively concluded that the only
truly inaccessible data is either tape backup or fragmented or damaged
data.27 Thus, with the limited exception of tape backups, the entire
universe of electronic mail, including locally archived mail messages such
as .pst files, is considered accessible. This definition, however, may be far
too broad, especially in light of the actual language of Rule 26.
[23] The Zubulake decision makes distinctions between accessible and
inaccessible based purely on the technological methods used for
retrieval.28 The amended Rule 26, however, protects parties from having
to produce any ESI that is “not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost.”29 It is quite conceivable, even likely, that a party will be
unable to access certain categories of ESI because of the “undue burden or
cost” even when those categories do not fall within one of the two narrow
categories of “inaccessible” ESI defined by Zubulake.
[24] An employer, for example, who is asked to produce all electronic
mail messages about certain employees, may be faced with the prospect of
searching through thousands of local e-mail archive files (such as .pst files
created by Microsoft Outlook). Although some of these files may be
contained on the employer’s network, they may also be located on local
drives, CD or DVD recordable media, or other locations. Because of the
25

In fact, Rule 26(b)(2)(C) was not changed by the 2006 Amendments.
Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 320 (“For these sources of e-mails – active mail files and emails stored on optical disks – it would be wholly inappropriate to even consider costshifting.”
27
Id. at 319-320.
28
Id.
29
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
26
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sheer volume of the possible universe of ESI that must be searched, it is
possible that such information is not “reasonably accessible” to that
employer because of the “undue burden or cost” associated with retrieving
it. Under those circumstances, the employer ought to at least be able to
argue that the court should consider shifting some of the cost to the
requesting party. However, under the Zubulake analysis, the court would
not even consider cost shifting because the data in question is not
damaged, fragmented or located on backup tapes. Thus, to avoid further
disparity in allocating the costs of electronic discovery, courts must be
prepared to take a broader view of accessible versus inaccessible within
the meaning of Rule 26.
[25] Second, even if an employer can show that certain ESI is not
reasonably accessible, it will still be forced to overcome some, if not all,
of the Zubulake seven factor test to justify cost shifting. The Zubulake test
was ostensibly derived from the existing rule at the time, which included
the discussion of the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and
most significantly, the parties’ resources. That portion of the Rule did not
change in December of 2006. Therefore, there is a strong likelihood that
courts will continue to look to the seven factor test articulated in Zubulake
to determine whether cost shifting is appropriate.30 For the reasons cited
above, the rote application of this test risks a significant disproportionate
impact on larger entities, such as employers, when compared to individual
adversaries with very little ESI in their custody or control.
[26] Quinby v. Westlb AG further demonstrates this point.31 In Quinby, a
former director of a securities firm brought gender discrimination and
retaliation claims against her former employer.32 The plaintiff initially
submitted a request for production seeking a search of nineteen employee
and former employees’ email accounts for references to the plaintiff
specifically and sexist content generally.33 Following the defendant’s
objections, the court limited the number of e-mail accounts to seventeen,
30

In re: Veeco Instruments, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23926 (S.D.N.Y., Apr. 2, 2007)
(acknowledging the 2006 Rule Amendments but nevertheless, relying on the Zubulake
factors in cost shifting analysis).
31
Quinby v. West LB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
32
Id. at 96.
33
Id. at 98.
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as well as the time period for some of those accounts.34 In order to obtain
the emails, the defendant hired a consultant to restore and search its
backup tapes.35 The consultant charged the defendant a total of
$226,266.60, which included a 25% premium for expediting the work.36
The defendant moved to shift those costs to the plaintiff.37 The plaintiff
opposed, arguing that because of its preservation obligations, the
defendant needed to have preserved the relevant documents in an
accessible format once it reasonably anticipated litigation, and therefore,
was not entitled to cost shifting as a threshold matter.38 Then, the court
agreed as to the majority of the e-mail accounts, because they involved
employees who worked for the company during and after the initiation of
the company’s preservation obligations.39
[27] The court then applied the Zubulake factors to determine the
appropriateness of cost shifting for the e-mail account of employees who
left prior to the obligation. As to the first two Zubulake factors, specific
tailoring and availability from other sources, the court upon review found
that the plaintiff’s sampling of relevant emails was too low to be
considered specifically tailored, especially when compared to the vast
number of documents ultimately produced from a search of the affected
account, and in spite of the fact the documents were not available from
another source.40 As to the next three Zubulake factors – amount in
controversy compared to cost of production, total cost compared to party
resources, and ability and incentives of the parties to control costs-- the
court noted that a) the plaintiff had the potential to receive a multi-million
dollar recovery in the case, which weighed against cost shifting; b) that the
employer’s assets in the billions of dollars weighed against costs shifting,
and c) that because the plaintiff requested a broad search, she had some
control over the cost, and therefore, this factor “slightly” weighed in favor
of cost shifting.41 As to the sixth factor, importance of issues at stake, the
court analogized the case specifically to Zubulake, which held that
34

Id. at 99.
Id. at 100.
36
Id. at 101.
37
Id. at 99.
38
Id. at 103.
39
Id. at 105-06.
40
Id. at 109.
41
Id. at 109-110.
35
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discrimination claims were “hardly unique,” making the factor “neutral” to
the cost shifting analysis.42 As to the seventh and “least important” factor,
the court concluded that because the plaintiff had more to gain, the factor
weighed in favor of cost shifting.43 The court ultimately determined that
the factors favored cost shifting as to the emails stemming from the period
prior to the preservation obligation. Even then, however, the court stated
that, “[e]ven where cost-shifting is granted, the defendant must still pay
for the majority of the production because of the presumption that the
responding party pays for its discovery cost.” 44 Again, the court cited
Zubulake, noting that because the plaintiff’s requested searches in the
present case were broader than those in Zubulake, and in Zubulake 25% of
the cost was shifted, shifting 30% of the cost of producing the e-mails
prior to preservation obligation was appropriate.45
[28] Thus, in Quinby, even with a favorable ruling on cost shifting, the
costs for production fell more heavily on the employer.
IV. THE COST OF COMPLIANCE
[29] Finally, certain aspects of the 2006 Amendments may also risk a
disproportionate cost allocation even before litigation begins. Rule 37
provides an often-touted “safe harbor” for the destruction of ESI that is the
result of “routine, good faith operation of an electronic information
system.”46 Ostensibly, this provision benefits employers because it creates
a potential defense in the event of the destruction of ESI. However, the
effect is likely to force employers to expend significant sums in
developing and implementing document retention and destruction policies.
Individual employees, on the other hand, face no equivalent obligation.
Generally, a preservation obligation by an individual employee can be met
by simply turning off his or her computer, or at worst, creating a forensic
copy of his or her hard drive. The implications for employers are
significantly more complex.

42

Id.
Id. at 110.
44
Id. at 111.
45
Id.
46
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(3).
43
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[30] Broccoli v. Echostar47 illustrates the dangers employers face when
they fail to meet these preservation obligations. In Broccoli, an employee
brought multiple claims against his former employer, alleging sex
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, as well as Maryland state
wage payment, breach of contract, and tortious interference claims. The
jury found in favor of the employer on the Title VII and tortious
interference claims and awarded a modest amount to the plaintiff on the
remaining state law claims.48
[31] During discovery, the plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions based on
the employer’s alleged failure to preserve critical employment documents,
in particular, those relating to the plaintiff’s November 2001 termination
and those relating to a reduction in force that the employer provided as the
bona fide reason for the termination.49 The plaintiff asserted that the
preservation obligation began in January 2001, when he made oral and
email complaints to two of his supervisors about the alleged sexually
harassing behavior of a human resource manager.50 The plaintiff stated he
complained again in July 2001 to a more senior member of human
resources, and again in November 2001 in conjunction with his
termination.51 The defendant asserted that it had no knowledge of the
plaintiff’s complaints until December 2001, when senior executives
received a letter from the plaintiff’s girlfriend alleging that the plaintiff’s
termination was discriminatory, and therefore, had no obligation to
suspend its ordinary practice of purging deleted e-mails twenty-one days
and personnel files thirty days after termination.52
[32] The court disagreed, citing Zubulake and holding that the employer
was on notice of the pending litigation and therefore, had a duty to
preserve, beginning in January 2001 when the plaintiff first complained to
his supervisors.53 The court stated that “[g]iven Echostar’s status as a
large public corporation with ample financial resources and personnel
management know-how, the court finds it indefensible that such basic
47

Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’n Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506 (D. Md. 2005).
Id at 508-509.
49
Id. at 509.
50
Id. at 510-511.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 511.
53
Id.
48
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personnel procedures and related documentation were lacking.”54
Accordingly, the court awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees associated with
discovery to the plaintiff, even though the plaintiff had actually lost on the
underlying Title VII claims. This amount was almost twice that of the jury
award for state wage payment law claims.55
[33] This decision highlights the potential costs of electronic discovery
compared to the actual value of an employment litigation claim. It also
demonstrates the unique risks to corporations when the notice of
threatened litigation comes from a current employee. As the Broccoli
court seems to suggest, one employee complaining to two supervisors
about his treatment can, under certain circumstances, put the entire
corporation on sufficient notice to require preservation of potentially
relevant ESI. To achieve the level of “corporate readiness” required to
meet such preservation obligations, corporate employers are now forced to
establish complex and costly legal hold procedures. Again, because of the
disparate nature of electronic discovery in the employment context,
employees are usually not saddled with such burdens.
V. CONCLUSION
[34] It is important that discovery rules avoid the systemic effect of
chilling discovery by either party. However, this concept, grounded on the
notion that litigation should be based on the facts equal and known to all
parties, cuts both ways. The cost shifting analysis in Zubulake, which will
likely continue to have a profound effect under the amended Federal
Rules, forces employers to bear the brunt of discovery costs. Because the
value of employment cases may be lower compared to these costs, the
result may cause a chilling effect on employers. While frequent cost
shifting may have the undesirable effect of chilling plaintiffs from
bringing litigation against their employers, the opposite risk should not be
ignored.

54
55

Id. at 512.
Id at 513-14.
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